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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of oil on economic growth in transition
economies of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE). We use oil production and reserves data in a series of
panel estimations to show that oil has had strong and robust positive
growth e®ects between 1990-2006. This is con¯rmed when we consider the
di®erent oil ownership structures. Additionally, we ¯nd that privatization
levels have had positive growth e®ects, while privatization speed has had
negative e®ects on growth.
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The apparent paradox that natural resource abundance leads to lower growth
performance has sparked much research into the so-called resource curse (see
Sachs and Warner, 1995). The issue is not con¯ned to the realm of economics:
in political science, as well, there have been numerous studies on the in°uence
of natural resources on institutional quality and political stability (see Rosser,
2006 for an overview). Recent contributions from both ¯elds have pointed to the
particularly strong negative economic and political impacts of mineral resource
abundance, especially oil.
It is therefore not surprising that the interest in oil and development has
extended to the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
and the former Soviet Union (FSU).1 Several transition economies, particularly
some of the newly independent nations of the FSU, possess sizeable oil and gas
reserves. The Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan are part of the Caspian Sea Basin, which is estimated to hold the
largest oil and gas deposits outside the Persian Gulf.2 According to one recent
study, these countries together constitute \the most important { and fastest-
growing [in terms of oil supply] { oil-producing region outside OPEC" (Ahrend
and Tompson, 2006, p. 5).
After a large decline through the mid-1990s, all oil-producing FSU coun-
tries have seen very high recent growth rates: according to the most recent es-
timates by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
the largest oil producer in the region, Russia, still had a GDP growth rate of 8%
during the ¯rst half of 2008. The other oil producing FSU countries have had
similar or even higher recent growth rates, with Azerbaijan reaching a record
30.5% growth in real GDP in 2006. This raises the question of whether oil can
help us explain the growth performance of transition economies, and whether
its contribution to growth has { on average { been positive or negative.
The fact that all countries of the FSU and CEE started on their transition
paths at more or less the same time, and with very similar initial socio-economic
conditions, makes the analysis of the in°uence of oil abundance on growth
1The term "transition\ countries or economies commonly refers to countries that are (or
were) in the process of transforming their economic (and political) systems from a socialist
centrally-planned economy to a more open and market-based one. Here, we concentrate on
the more recent transition countries of CEE and the FSU, plus Mongolia, without considering
China, the East Asian and other transition countries.
2The Caspian Sea Basin also includes Iran. There is still some degree of uncertainty over
the exact dimension of the reserves in the region, see e.g., von Hirschhausen and Engerer
(1999) and Ahrend and Tompson (2006).
2particularly appealing. Once we have controlled for other economic and political
factors, we should be able to isolate the e®ect of oil with more precision than
is usually possible in larger and more heterogeneous country samples.
The present paper focuses on answering this question by examining the
determinants of growth since the start of transition in 27 countries from 1990-
2006 in a series of empirical estimations. The results show that on average
oil abundance, measured in terms of production or reserves, has unequivocally
increased economic growth, even after considering many other plausible factors.
With other words, there is no sign of an oil curse so far. On the contrary, the
exploitation of their mineral resources seems to have helped the resource-rich
countries in their recovery from the transition shock.
Moreover, the analysis also o®ers a ¯rst attempt at di®erentiating the growth
e®ects of oil based on the resource's ownership structure. The ¯ndings show that
fully state-owned oil sectors seem to have contributed most positively to growth,
followed by domestic private ownership of oil. However, the small number of oil
states in the sample and the limited variation in ownership strategies caution
against generalising this result.
A further conclusion regards the debate on privatization (or liberalization)
speeds: by separating privatization levels from privatization speed, we show
that the overall level has had positive growth e®ects, while higher speed (in
the style of \shock therapy") has dampened growth. Finally, after more than
a decade of transition, only a few measures of initial conditions still have an
e®ect on economic performance.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a literature overview;
Section 3 presents the data and methodology; Section 4 shows the estimation
results; and Section 5 closes with a discussion of the results.
2 Literature review
This paper draws on two strands of literature: the ¯rst regards the resource
curse, while the second looks at growth and development in transition economies.
Only a handful of studies so far explicitly include the former issue in the treat-
ment of the latter.
The resource curse literature has been greatly in°uenced by the research of
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999), who popularized primary resource exports over
GDP as a measure of resource wealth. The contributions since then have been
too numerous to list in detail here; for a critical discussion and more extensive
literature overview, see Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008a,b). Several studies
have not only di®erentiated resources based on their geographical concentra-
3tion and easier appropriability { so-called point resources { but have stressed
the particularly deleterious e®ects of petroleum, describing the long-term cor-
ruptive in°uence of plentiful oil rents on institutional quality and growth (e.g.,
Karl, 1997; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003), and on institutional quality,
political stability and armed con°ict (e.g., Ross, 2001, 2006; Fearon, 2005).3
The performance of transition countries has been a similarly popular re-
search topic in the last years. Although the transition of China and Viet-
nam had already featured in scholarly debates, the fall of the Iron Curtain
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union was an unprecedented event not only
for political scientists and historians, but also for economists. The sheer size
of the task of simultaneously transforming so many formerly centrally-planned
economies into market-based systems, and building the supporting institutional
(and social) structures { often practically from scratch { has prompted count-
less contributions on the merits of one transition strategy versus another, and
the determinants of successful post-transition growth.
One of the earliest studies to evaluate the determinants of post-transition
economic perfomance was provided by De Melo et al. (1996), who introduced a
widely used index of liberalization to measure reform progress. Subsequent work
includes De Melo et al. (1997) and Krueger and Ciolko (1998), who concentrate
on the importance of initial conditions such as pre-transition macroeconomic
distortions for explaining growth performance; Heybey and Murrell (1999), who
¯rst distinguish between the e®ects of liberalization (or privatization) speed and
level; Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2003), who concentrate on the importance
of institutions and the policies that emerge. Most recently, Godoy and Stiglitz
(2006) have re-evaluated previous ¯ndings to conclude that initial conditions
are no longer determining factors in economic performance, and that \shock
therapy" (fast-liberalizing) countries have grown more slowly in the ¯rst ten
years of transition. Thorough literature overviews are given by Guriev and
Ickes (2000), who focus on the microeconomic factors in°uencing growth in
CEE and FSU countries, and Campos and Coricelli (2002). The latter are
also among the few authors to emphasize the importance of ¯nancial (credit)
markets for a successful transition.
The role of resource wealth has been considered in several studies on the
economic performance of transition countries. De Melo et al. (1997) were the
¯rst to include a simple qualitative measure of natural resource abundance in
their estimations of the determinants of growth, in°ation and liberalization
3There are of course also dissident views: see Brunnschweiler (2008), Brunnschweiler and
Bulte (2008), and Alexeev and Conrad (2009) on oil and growth, and Smith (2004) and
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) on oil and civil war.
4in the transition economies of CEE, the FSU and East Asia. They classi¯ed
the countries in the sample as resource-poor, moderately or highly resource-
abundant, and included this measure in one of their principal-components clus-
ters of initial conditions. The results indicate that resource abundance had
(weak) positive growth e®ects, although it is di±cult to pinpoint the in°uence
of natural resources in the cluster. Several studies have since used a similar
approach, including Berg et al. (1999) and Fischer and Sahay (2000). Gylfa-
son (2000) uses the share of natural capital in total wealth to measure natural
resource abundance and ¯nds that resource-abundant transition countries have
seen lower income growth and development progress than their resource-poor
counterparts. Kronenberg (2004) takes the share of primary exports in total
exports to arrive at a similar conclusion.
Given the presence of several mineral fuel-abundant countries in the group of
recent transition countries from CEE and the FSU,4 it isn't surprising that some
studies have focused on the in°uence of oil (and gas) on economic performance.
Esanov et al. (2001) argue that resource rents have allowed the fuel mineral-
rich FSU countries to postpone real reform e®orts. Ahrend (2002) examines the
case of Russia and ¯nds that resource abundance { proxied by oil, gas and coal
production { had a positive impact on the economic performance of Russian
regions during the ¯rst few years of transition.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the contributions of Jones Luong and Weinthal
(2001, 2009), who focus on the oil (and gas) ownership structures in mineral-
rich FSU countries. They draw some conclusions on the ¯scal policy outcomes
under the di®erent ownership structures, without however extending their pre-
dictions to overall economic performance (see the following section for a more
detailed discussion).
3 Data description and methodology
Our primary interest lies in determining whether the oil-rich transition countries
have fared better or worse in terms of economic growth than their oil-poor
counterparts. We concentrate on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) { including some former Yugoslav republics technically in Southeastern
Europe { and the newly independent states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU).
We have also collected data on Mongolia, which { though nominally independent
{ was a socialist country very closely tied to the Soviet Union, and began its
transition process during the same timeframe. This gives us a sample of 15 FSU
4For an overview of the oil and gas sectors in the FSU, see von Hirschhausen and Engerer
(1999) and Ahrend and Tompson (2006).
5and 11 CEE countries plus Mongolia, for a total of 27 transition countries, all
of which started their economic and political transitions within a limited period
between 1990-1992.5
All these countries had a common experience of socialist rule over many
decades, and faced similar challenges at the start of their transition, including
the huge task of transforming their economies from planned into market-based
systems. In addition, many countries also found themselves as newly inde-
pendent states, with no or only limited political experience in independent
policy-making in living memory. Moreover, because they started their transi-
tion within a couple of years of each other, we can also say that the external
political and economic environment was much the same for all.6 These simi-
lar initial conditions therefore allow us to e®ectively control for many factors
which may possibly in°uence economic performance, giving us a unique chance
of isolating the e®ects of oil wealth.
On the downside, it is also clear that the observation period from 1990-2006
is necessarily short, ranging from a minimum of 9 to a maximum of 17 yearly
observations (depending on the start of transition and data availability), which
limits the options for empirical work. In particular, we will follow most of the
literature on transition economies and perform panel estimations with yearly
data.7
Since all initial conditions variables and several other covariates are time-
invariant, we concentrate on results using random e®ects estimations. However,
our main conclusions remain valid using ¯xed e®ects estimation (results are
shown in the Appendix).
The dependent variable is (log) yearly per capita GDP growth (G), esti-
mated with income data from the TransMonee database. We regress this on
5The countries included and the start of their transition are: FSU (1992): Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Rus-
sian Federation, Tajistikan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; CEE: Albania (1991), Bosnia
and Herzegovina (1992), Bulgaria (1991), Croatia (1990), Czech Republic (1991), Hungary
(1990), Macedonia (1990), Poland (1990), Romania (1991), Slovakia (1991), Slovenia (1990);
and Mongolia (1990).
6This point is not to be discounted, given the importance of international ¯nancial organi-
zations such as the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development in shaping transition policies.
7Some early studies resorted to cross-country OLS estimations, with mixed success. Our
own OLS estimations for the period since the start of transition gave only weak results (see
Appendix, Table B). It is conventional in growth empirics using panel data to perform esti-
mations with ¯ve or ten-year averages, in order to eliminate cyclical °uctuations. However,
using ¯ve or even three-year averages radically reduced the number of observations in our sam-
ple, rendering statistical inference meaningless. Instead, we try to control for major common
cyclical shocks during our short time period, see below.
6several independent variables according to the following equation:8
Git = ®1 + ®2oilit + ®3Xit + ®4ICit + !it: (1)
oil denotes our measure of oil wealth in country i in period t. We use both
a °ow and a stock measure, namely oil production (oilprodpc) and oil reserves
(oilrespc), dividing them by population in order to have relative indicators.
Oil reserves are better able to capture the concept of oil abundance, while oil
production is also subject to other factors such as market price °uctuations,
extraction and delivery disruptions, and seasonal in°uences in the more in-
hospitable regions.9 Both measures may be in°uenced by technology levels;
however, because of these countries' common legacies { including very high ed-
ucation levels { it is reasonable to say that if there is indeed an endogeneity
issue, the bias will be equal across the sample and therefore not drive our re-
sults.10 The data are based on the BP oil and gas database and cross-checked
with the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) database for consistency.11
The sample contains six countries that produce a substantial amount of
oil. Five of them are FSU countries, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The sixth one, Romania, is part of the CEE
group of countries. The largest producer in both relative and absolute terms is
Russia, which at the end of the period (in 2006) had nearly 80 billion barrels in
proven oil reserves and was producing nearly 9.8 million barrels of oil per day;
followed by Kazakhstan with nearly 40 billion barrels in reserves and over 1.4
million barrels in daily production; Azerbaijan (7 billion barrels reserves, over
650 thousand daily production); Turkmenistan (600 million barrels reserves,
around 186 thousand barrels daily production); Uzbekistan (nearly 600 million
barrels reserves, 125 thousand production); and Romania (over 470 million
barrels reserves, 104 thousand production).
8The main results employ same-year variables to maximize the sample size. In robustness
tests, we also used explanatory variables lagged by one to ¯ve years. Despite the smaller sample
sizes, the principal ¯ndings { particularly on the sign and signi¯cance of the oil variables {
remained unchanged (available upon request).
9In additional robustness tests (see below) we also use net per capita oil exports, as well
as the ratio of oil exports over total merchandise exports and over GDP (measures of oil
dependence). We present results for oil reserves and production because in our view they
come closer to capturing oil abundance or wealth.
10It is worth noting that civil con°ict is also not likely to have in°uenced oil extraction
substantially in any of these oil producing countries: Azerbaijan and Russia both saw con°ict
during this period, but the con°ict areas were not close to major oil ¯elds.
11The EIA database is more detailed than the BP database; however, the EIA data include
information on oil re¯nery and related production, as well as minimal amounts of oil, while
the BP data concentrate on major oil producers and are therefore more useful for our purpose.
7X is a vector of covariates that includes (log) in°ation, (log) population,
the average privatization level (privat) and speed (privatspeed), a measure of
banking reform (bankref ), investment (inv), and an economic shock measure.
We distinguish between privatization level and speed (following Heybey and
Murrell, 1999; Berg et al., 1999; and Godoy and Stiglitz, 2006) by using the
average value of the EBRD Transition Report indicators for combined small-
and large-scale privatization. The transition indicators range between 0 and
5, where 5 denotes full liberalization (or economic transition). Privatization
speed since transition is calculated as (L(t) ¡ L(0))=t, where t denotes the
number of years since the start of transition.12 The banking reform measure is
also taken from the EBRD Transition Report indicators and measures overall
banking sector reform and interest rate liberalization; it takes into account
the recent conclusion of Campos and Coricelli (2002) that the role of ¯nancial
sector development in transition countries, though potentially very important,
has often been neglected in empirical studies. Investment inv is expressed
in percent of GDP and taken from the TransMONEE database. In order to
capture possible time trends, we include an economic shock measure for the
major ¯nancial crisis that hit East Asia and then Russia and the rest of the
FSU and CEE between 1997-1998. The variable ¯ncrisis takes on a value of
zero until 1997, and then increases with every successive year after the crisis to
capture the diminishing dampening economic e®ects of the shock over time.
IC includes several measures of initial conditions that have been men-
tioned in the literature, namely (log) initial income (lninitialinc), the urban-
ization rate in 1990 (urban1990), and a measure of trade dependence in 1990
(tradep1990).13 Urbanization rates (from De Melo et al., 1997) and the initial
income { de¯ned as (log) per capita income during the ¯rst year of transition
(TransMonee database) { both proxy for the level of initial economic develop-
ment, with the latter also controlling for convergence e®ects. The trade shares
in GDP (from De Melo et al., 1997) re°ect the degree of dependence on trade
with other countries in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
12Similar results were found when using only the privatization speed during the ¯rst ¯ve or
¯rst ten years of transition.
13Several other measures of initial conditions have been used in the literature, often \con-
densed" into principal components. They include average growth before transition; a dummy
variable for proximity to a market economy; an indicator for repressed in°ation during central
planning; the black market premium before transition; years under central planning; a mea-
sure of \over-industrialization"; and a categorical variable for previously independent states,
decentralized or newly independent states (see De Melo et al., 1997 for more details). None
of these variables { or their combination in principal components { was robustly related to
growth over the longer period considered in this paper.
8area; it can be expected that the higher the economic interdependence, the
greater the negative shock from the sudden disruption due to transition.
For further details and descriptive statistics on all variables, see the Ap-
pendix.
3.1 The issue of oil ownership
The literature has largely ignored the issue of the ownership structure of mineral
resources and the possible in°uence it has on the e®ects of resource wealth on
a country's economic and political development. The most common (implicit)
assumption has been that mineral deposits and companies have been mainly
state-owned since the 1960s, despite the involvement of many private ¯rms
around the world (see for example Karl, 1997). Yet, the mineral ownership
structure could have potentially large e®ects: whether a resource is owned by a
private ¯rm or by the government of the resource-rich nation has implications
for rent appropriation, exploration and production decisions, and even for the
exposure to market price °uctuations.
An exception is given by the studies of Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001,
2009), which have concentrated on the ownership structures of mineral wealth,
in particular oil, how they emerged, and what institutional e®ects they have.
The authors developed their theory to analyse the oil and gas-rich former Soviet
states, and then extended it to other mineral-rich countries. They propose that
it is not resource wealth that \curses" mineral-rich countries, but rather their
chosen ownership structure. They distinguish between four di®erent possible
ownership structures (see Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2001, 2009 for a more
detailed description): the ¯rst is state ownership with control (S1), where the
state has the rights of developing and exploiting mineral deposits and holds over
50% of mineral sector company shares. Second, state ownership without control
(S2), where the state still owns the rights to the mineral deposits as well as the
majority (> 50%) of shares, but allows greater scope for foreign investment with
foreign managerial and operational control, for example in production sharing
agreements (PSAs). The third possibility is private domestic ownership (P1),
where private domestic ¯rms hold the rights to the development of mineral
deposits and the majority of shares (> 50%) in the sector. The fourth and ¯nal
ownership structure is private foreign ownership (P2), where private foreign
companies own both the rights to develop the mineral deposits and the majority
of shares (> 50%) in the mineral sector.
Jones Luong and Weinthal mainly concentrate on how the di®erent own-
ership structures a®ect the institutional outcomes in mineral-rich states, in
9particular the ¯scal regimes. S1 can be expected to foster weak ¯scal regimes,
in the sense of unstable and ine±cient tax systems, and low incentives for bud-
getary discipline and transparency. At the other end of the spectrum, P1 would
tend to foster strong ¯scal regimes, because this structure gives both domestic
private owners and the governing ¶ elites incentives for demanding and supply-
ing strong institutions, which limit the government's ability for rent extraction
while setting clear rules for mineral exploitation. Fiscal regimes under S2 and
P2 are classi¯ed as \hybrid", because foreign investors are able to stabilize their
¯scal burden and also { to the extent that the governing ¶ elites have an incentive
for transparency { direct the use of the proceeds from mineral rents towards
socio-economic development.
As a consequence, we would expect countries that choose an ownership
structure of type P1 to reap the greatest positive long-term economic bene¯ts
from mineral wealth, with those choosing S1 most likely to su®er from a \curse"
of mineral wealth on their economic performance. S2 and P2-type ownership
structures would lead to economic outcomes somewhere in between these two
extremes.
In order to examine whether the mineral ownership structure changes the
growth impact of oil, we interact our oil variables with a dummy for ownership
type according to the following equation:
Git = ¯1 + ¯2oilit + ¯3ownershipit ¤ oilit + ¯4Xit + ¯5ICit + ²it: (2)
We set S1 as the base ownership strategy, whose growth e®ect is given by
¯2.14 ¯3 indicates whether a di®erent strategy has led to higher (i.e. positive
coe±cient) or lower (i.e. negative coe±cient) growth e®ects of oil; the total
e®ect of alternative ownership strategies is given by the sum ¯2 + ¯3. The
remaining covariates are de¯ned as above in equation (1).
The ownership structures of the ¯ve oil-rich countries of the FSU and Ro-
mania are shown in Table 1 (based on Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2001, 2009).
Most of the countries chose S1 at some point. The only country to implement
a P1-type strategy was Russia, which switched to S1 in 2005 after a series of
takeovers of private domestic oil companies by state-controlled ¯rms. Azerbai-
jan, and more recently Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have an S2-type ownership
structure, while Kazakhstan (until 2004) and Romania (since 2004) chose full
foreign private ownership under P2. The fact that we have only one example of
P1 in our sample may limit the latitude for statistical inference; nevertheless,
14Similar overall results are achieved by using the other ownership types as the base outcome
(results available upon request).
10this exploratory analysis should deliver some interesting insights on the role of
mineral ownership in the \oil curse" debate.
4 Estimation results
We present the main estimation results in the following subsections, concen-
trating ¯rst on the growth impacts of oil in FSU and other transition countries,
and then on the role of oil ownership.
4.1 Oil and growth in transition economies
Table 2 presents estimation results for equation (1) on the sample of 15 FSU
countries. Columns (1)-(5) show speci¯cations using oil production per capita
(oilprodpc), while columns (6)-(10) use oil reserves per capita (oilrespc).
We start out with a parsimonious speci¯cation, adding only our oil mea-
sure, in°ation, privatization level and speed, and the initial conditions variables
(columns (1) and (6)). We then successively control for size e®ects (lnpop), in-
vestment rates, banking sector development, and the shock produced by the
¯nancial crisis of 1997-98. The results remain consistent regardless of the spec-
i¯cation: ¯rst, oil { both in terms of per capita production and reserves { has
strong positive growth e®ects. Using the results from column (1) to calculate
the beta coe±cients, we see that one standard deviation increase in oil produc-
tion (equal to an additional 0.0226 barrels per capita per day) would lead to
an increase in growth of (0:0226 ¤ 1:866=0:1225) 0.344 standard deviations, or
just over one third (all other things equal). Similarly, column (6) shows that a
standard-deviation increase in oil reserves per capita (0.5 thousand barrels per
capita) would have a positive growth e®ect of 0.14 standard deviations. More-
over, the magnitude of the e®ects does not vary substantially across speci¯ca-
tions, further suggesting that the coe±cients are relatively precisely estimated.
With other words, the e®ect is economically important { especially regarding
oil production { though not overwhelming.
The other coe±cients mostly have the expected signs, with the basic co-
variates entering with high signi¯cance, particularly in the speci¯cations with
oil production. In°ation has a negative impact on growth; privatization levels
a®ect economic performance positively, while privatization speed on the other
hand has a negative e®ect. This is in line with Godoy and Stiglitz (2006),
who also found that transition countries that implemented a \shock therapy"
approach to privatization saw slower growth than those that chose a more grad-
ualist approach, and contradicts the earlier ¯ndings of Berg et al. (1999) who
had arrived at the opposite conclusion. However, it is yet too early to tell how
11long-lasting these growth-dampening e®ects of fast privatization were, since we
can only judge performance over the ¯rst 15 years since the start of transition.
(Some aspects of) initial conditions continue to have an in°uence on growth
performance, though not always in the expected direction: highly urbanized
countries have seen higher growth rates, while initially relatively poor economies
show signs of convergence with the higher-income countries. Trade dependence
has also had a strong in°uence on growth outcomes, albeit not in the expected
direction: it appears that countries that were more outward-oriented at the
start of transition did not su®er long from the collapse of the CMEA trading
region, but were able to take advantage of at least some of their previously
established export industries to fuel growth during the transition period.
Larger countries seem to have fared slightly better than smaller ones, mea-
sured by the size of their populations. Investment has generally had a positive
impact on growth, though not always signi¯cant. Interestingly, banking reforms
have not had any strong positive growth e®ects: on the contrary, the coe±cient
is consistently negative and in one case even marginally signi¯cant. It may be
that the overall economic e®ects of ¯nancial intermediation development have
not yet had time to take hold. Finally, the ¯nancial crisis does not seem to
have had any lasting impact on the economies of the FSU.
The ¯ndings described above carry over to the results for the larger sample
including all 27 transition countries, shown in Table 3. Most importantly, both
oil production and oil reserves have strong positive growth e®ects, with beta
coe±cients of 0.177 and 0.105, respectively (using the results from columns (1)
and (6)). With other words, the e®ects are smaller in the larger sample, though
still important and highly signi¯cant. Note also that the dummy variable for
the FSU shows that the former Soviet countries have had lower growth rates
overall, ceteris paribus.
The estimation ¯ts in terms of their R-squareds are good, both for the
smaller FSU sample and the larger sample with all transition countries. This
indicates that the chosen speci¯cations capture many factors that have been
relevant for growth since the start of transition. In further robustness tests, we
also added measures for income inequality, education levels, years under cen-
tral planning, domestic credit to the private sector, a regime failure dummy, the
overall average EBRD transition indicator value, and variations on the privati-
zation speed measure to cover only the ¯rst ¯ve or ten years of transition. Most
additional regressors were insigni¯cant, with the exception of the privatization
speed variables, and the central planning years measure (in the FSU sample).
Finally, we also used three alternative oil measures, namely per capita oil ex-
ports, and the ratio of oil exports to total merchandise exports and to GDP (the
12latter two more aptly capturing oil dependence). The results remained qual-
itatively and quantitatively robust to these changes (available upon request).
Most importantly, per capita oil exports and oil exports over total merchandise
exports were positive and highly signi¯cant, while oil exports over GDP { albeit
positive { were not signi¯cant.
In the Appendix (Tables C-E), we also show results using ¯xed e®ects panel
estimations. These con¯rm the main results: per capita oil production and
reserves have had positive growth impacts in both samples, with oil production
proving particularly robust even in the smaller FSU sample. Moreover, the
magnitudes of the growth e®ects increase w.r.t. to the ¯ndings using random
e®ects. However, the overall estimation ¯ts are notably reduced by choosing this
estimation strategy, indicating that the time-invariant regressors are important
determinants of growth.
4.2 Does oil ownership matter?
As mentioned above, an interesting but often neglected issue concerns the e®ect
of resource ownership on the ultimate impact of mineral wealth on the econ-
omy. In order to examine whether the ownership structure changes the results
seen above, in Table 4 we add an interaction term between the oil measure and
the ownership type dummy (according to equation (2)), with full state own-
ership (S1) being the base outcome.15 This means that the coe±cient for the
oil measure (oilprodpc or oilrespc) shows the e®ect for S1-type ownership of
oil resources, while the interaction terms give the variation for the respective
ownership strategy.
We ¯rst test whether the four oil variables { the oil measures with and with-
out interaction { are jointly signi¯cant. Joint signi¯cance is con¯rmed in three
out of four cases, namely in columns (1) and (3) (at the 1%-level) and column
(2) (3%-level), while we cannot reject joint insigni¯cance for speci¯cation (4).
Second, it is interesting to see that the net growth e®ect of oil, measured
either in terms of production or of reserves, remains positive and signi¯cant for
all ownership structures. Recall that the net growth e®ect of oil in countries
with S2-type ownership, for example, is given by summing up the coe±cients of
the respective interaction term (S2=1) and the oil measure without interaction.
The overall positive impact is particularly strong in the smaller FSU sample;
oil reserves in the full sample narrowly miss conventional signi¯cance, being
signi¯cant only at the 11%-level.
15We show results only for the basic speci¯cations for both samples; adding additional
variables did not a®ect the ¯ndings. Moreover, for space reasons we don't show the results
for the other covariates. Full results are available upon request.
13However, although the interaction terms are rarely even marginally sig-
ni¯cant, they are all consistently negative. This suggests that all ownership
structures have brought lower positive growth e®ects than majority state own-
ership without important foreign investment (S1), the base group. A P1-type
structure achieves only the second-largest positive impact, followed by the two
\hybrid" ownership structures of S2 and P2. Comparing the magnitudes of the
e®ects with those found in the previous speci¯cations without di®erentiating by
ownership structure, countries with S1-type oil ownership have had larger posi-
tive growth bene¯ts, with beta coe±cients for oil production of 0.48 in the FSU
and 0.25 in the full sample, and of 1.03 and 0.56, respectively, for oil reserves.
The size of the positive growth e®ects for countries choosing other ownership
structures is more in line with the magnitudes found in Tables 2-3.
These ¯ndings apparently contradict the expectations based on the hypothe-
ses of Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2009), according to which S1-type (P1)
mineral resource ownership leads to the worst (best) ¯scal regime outcomes,
and therefore supposedly also to the worst (best) overall economic performance.
The explanation may however lie less in a mistake in the theoretical prediction
than in the size of the sample at our disposal for the empirical estimations.
The ¯ndings are likely due to the small number of petroleum-rich states among
transition countries on the one hand, and on the other to the fact that most
of these oil states have chosen S1-type ownership strategies for at least part of
the (short) time period under examination. Only one country (Russia) chose
P1. This introduces a statistical bias in favor of S1-type ownership strategy.
Therefore, we view these results as an interesting ¯rst attempt at di®erentiating
oil-rich countries according to the ownership structure of their mineral sectors
and evaluating the economic e®ects of the chosen strategies, and encourage
further research into this issue.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The so-called resource curse has been a popular research topic among economists
and political scientists during the last decade. Many studies concur that neg-
ative economic and political outcomes are most likely with certain types of
natural resources { often termed point-source resources { one of which is oil.
Some of the reasons for oil's negative e®ects supposedly lie in the high rents
that can be extracted from oil production, and oil's relatively easy appropri-
ability, which both make it an attractive target for corruptive and potentially
economically and politically disruptive rent-seeking.
This paper examined the oil curse hypothesis for a narrow set of transition
14countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE), which present the interesting characteristic of having started out on a
major economic and political reform path at virtually the same time and with
very similar initial socio-economic conditions. Some 15 years later, this huge
experiment allows us to draw some conclusions on whether the presence of oil in
a handful of these countries has contributed to economic performance, and if so,
in what direction. The ¯ndings show without any doubt that oil { measured
both in terms of per capita production and reserves { has so far on average
had decidedly positive growth e®ects. Moreover, the positive growth e®ects of
oil are con¯rmed for di®erent mineral ownership strategies, which is { to our
knowledge { the ¯rst time that this issue has been addressed explicitly in the
context of resources and growth.
However, it is also important to note that the strong positive growth e®ects
found so far in the transition economies of the FSU and CEE need not neces-
sarily hold in the future, as well. A necessary provision for continued strong
growth performance is the wise investment of oil revenues not only into the oil
sector itself (in order to maintain and possibly enlarge production and distri-
bution throughout the estimated extraction period), but also into other sectors
of the economy (in the sense of long-term economic diversi¯cation). This pro-
vision may not be met in all countries under analysis. For example, there are
signs that Russia's economy is worryingly biased towards the oil and gas sector,
while at the same time not enough new investment is being undertaken to se-
cure future production. This combination bodes ill for long-term development
in the region's largest economy.
And it remains to be seen whether integration into the European Union
may not prove to be a much more important driver of economic growth in the
future than mineral wealth, setting the CEE countries even farther apart from
their fellow former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance members of the
FSU. Already it is apparent from the empirical results that FSU countries {
including the oil-rich ones { are generally lagging behind the CEE countries in
economic performance. It will therefore be interesting to re-examine the results
of the present paper further down the road to see whether there is still no oil
curse in sight.
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21Table 4. Oil ownership and growth in FSU countries





s2*oil variable -0.794 -197.9* -0.266 -101.4
(-0.96) (-1.74) (-0.37) (-1.11)
p1*oil variable -0.266 -19.64 -0.948 -83.24
(-0.30) (-0.17) (-1.23) (-0.84)
p2*oil variable -0.783 -209.1* -0.634 -123.2
(-0.92) (-1.86) (-0.84) (-1.37)
fsu -0.0389** -0.0294
(-1.96) (-1.48)
Observations 214 214 396 396
Sample FSU FSU all transition all transition
Number of countryid 15 15 27 27
r2within 0.640 0.630 0.540 0.530
r2between 0.410 0.380 0.350 0.350
r2overall 0.610 0.590 0.500 0.500
Notes: All estimations are random e®ects GLS panel estimations with real per capita growth
as the dependent variable. Initial conditions (initial income, trade dependence in 1990, and
urbanization in 1990), in°ation, privatization level and speed, and constant term included




signi¯cant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
22Appendix
Data description
post-transition growth: Year-on-year growth rate of real GDP per capita
(constant prices) after start of transition. Source: TransMONEE database,
May 2008, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre.
oil production per capita (oilprodpc): Oil production in barrels per day.
Source: British Petroleum 2008 Statistical Review of World Energy, cross-
checked with Energy Information Agency database.
oil reserves per capita (oilrespc): Oil reserves in million barrels. Source:
British Petroleum 2008 Statistical Review of World Energy, cross-checked with
Energy Information Agency database.
oil ownership dummy variables (S1, S2, P1, P2): Oil ownership structure
classi¯ed as majority state-owned with no or little foreign investment (S1),
majority state-owned with substantial foreign investment (S2), majority private
domestic ownership (P1), and majority foreign private ownership (P2). Source:
Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2009).
(log) in°ation (lnin°ation): natural logarithm of in°ation (GDP de°ator),
annual %. Source: World Development Indicators.
privatization level (avgprivat) and speed (privatspeed): privatization is
given by the yearly average of small- and large-scale privatization indicators.
privatization speed since start of transition is calculated as (L(t)-L(0))/t where
t denotes the number of years since the start of transition. Source: EBRD
Transition Report.
(log) population (lnpop): Natural logarithm of population. Source: Trans-
MONEE database, May 2008, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, and Penn
World Tables 6.2.
investment in percent of GDP (inv): Investment as percent of GDP.
Source: TransMONEE database, May 2008, UNICEF Innocenti Research Cen-
tre.
banking reform (bankref ): Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation
indicator. Source: EBRD Transition Report.
¯nancial crisis (¯ncrisis): Financial crisis measure with value zero until 1997
and increasing value with every year after the crisis.
(log) initial income (lninitialinc): Natural logarithm of GDP per capita
(constant prices) in year of start of transition. Source: TransMONEE database,
May 2008, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre.
23trade dependence in 1990 (tradep1990): Trade dependence in 1990 in
percent of GDP. From de Melo et al. (1997).
urbanization rates in 1990 (urban1990): Urbanization rate in 1990 in
percent of total population. From de Melo et al. (1997).
FSU country dummy (fsu): Country dummy with value one for 15 countries
of former Soviet Union.
Table A. Descriptive statistics
FSU countries
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
post-trans growth 219 0.0061 0.1225 -0.581 0.2854
oil production pc 262 0.015 0.0226 0 0.0931
oil reserves pc 228 0.0002 0.0005 0 0.0027
ln in°ation 270 3.3399 2.0825 -2.9986 9.6449
privatization level 270 2.5424 1.0949 1 4.165
privatization speed 225 0.2844 0.2137 0 1.335
ln population 405 15.8367 1.1761 14.1108 18.8174
investment (percent GDP) 232 24.3668 8.0799 -0.7 59
banking reform 270 1.8827 0.8393 1 4
ln initial income 260 7.0828 0.764 5.7287 8.315
urbanisation 1990 237 56.9958 13.317 32 74
trade dependence 1990 237 28.6768 7.4265 11 41
All transition countries
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
post-trans growth 406 0.0143 0.1048 -0.581 0.6268
oil production pc 421 0.0065 0.0161 0 0.0931
oil reserves pc 421 0.0001 0.0004 0 0.0027
ln in°ation 410 3.0814 1.9302 -3.0945 9.6449
privatization level 422 2.997 0.9089 1 4.1650
privatization speed 422 0.2621 0.2096 -0.5 1.335
ln population 422 15.7386 1.0718 14.1108 18.8174
investment (percent GDP) 421 23.9798 7.0864 -0.7 59
banking reform 422 2.3090 0.8846 1 4
ln initial income 414 7.4429 0.8519 5.7287 8.9951
urbanisation 1990 420 58.0119 11.0182 32 74
trade dependence 1990 420 19.8129 12.1474 3.7 41
24Table B. OLS estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All transition All transition
FSU FSU countries countries
avg oil production pc 0.7076 -0.0405
(1.17) (-0.11)
avg oil reserves pc 16.377*** 8.426
(2.78) (1.42)
avg privatization 0.0368** 0.0241** 0.00575 0.00569
(2.09) (2.39) (0.62) (0.60)
ln in°ation 0.00879 0.00467 -0.0114** -0.0124**
(1.38) (0.88) (-2.17) (-2.37)
ln initial income -0.0385* -0.0264 -0.0267*** -0.0268***
(-1.81) (-1.62) (-3.13) (-3.08)
trade dependence 1990 0.00337* 0.00218*** -0.000126 -0.0000728
(1.70) (2.91) (-0.28) (-0.16)
urbanisation 1990 0.00280*** 0.00245*** 0.00215*** 0.00214***
(3.00) (2.72) (3.34) (3.29)
Constant -0.122 -0.0900 0.138** 0.141***
(-1.43) (-1.18) (2.50) (2.59)
Observations 15 15 27 27
R-squared 0.62 0.62 0.48 0.48
F-stat P-value 0.2 0.09 0.042 0.041
Notes: All estimations are OLS with per annum per capita growth since transition as the
dependent variable. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
¤,
¤¤,
¤¤¤ statistically signi¯cant at 10,



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table E. Fixed effects - oil ownership and growth





s2*oil variable -2.662 -157.9 -2.203 -207.1
(-1.30) (-0.55) (-1.21) (-0.82)
p1*oil variable 0.638 -11.87 0.584 7.315
(0.55) (-0.090) (0.55) (0.061)
p2*oil variable -2.876 -161.3 -2.316 -211.8
(-1.32) (-0.56) (-1.20) (-0.84)
Observations 214 214 397 397
Sample FSU FSU all all
transition transition
Countries 15 15 27 27
R-squared within 0.66 0.65 0.55 0.54
r2between 0.0700 0.170 0.0400 0.120
r2overall 0.390 0.450 0.350 0.390
Notes: All estimations are ¯xed e®ects GLS panel estimations with real per capita growth as
the dependent variable. In°ation, privatization level and speed, and constant term included




at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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